CVE-2026-89532svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks

Official description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks When a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero, pcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as &chunk->ch_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the ch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at sizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults. A zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire: xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than rc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk onto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs, so a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves ch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated Send-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four PCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment->rs_handle on each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read and a general protection fault. xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk pcl_alloc_write() chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...) /* ch_segcount = 0 */ list_add_tail(&chunk->ch_list, &pcl->cl_chunks) /* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */ svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl) pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk) pos <= &ch_segments[0u - 1u] /* 0xFFFFFFFF */ segment->rs_handle /* OOB read -> GPF */ Fix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses ch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the loop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount > 0 the iteration range is unchanged. All six existing call sites in net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound, so no caller changes are needed.

Affected packages & fixed versions

Affected products (as reported)

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e2e3481e39103a386b86be1c33eaef97cbdf16e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a78b841879c2a3243f74edc514236fb2907167f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06d0390c37fa6714624af771bd72bbf1a7ed9bb1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c5a03c3dc505c0295339b0a1b9e4fe36447e482
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1c954ca4977a4e6ec73ef92fe48073ec54f9fc8
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d33a7e6bf6c6b293a266a617201285a1ad32c56
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7713a784c59515d0aba558c8f5df6a0164dd3a9