Vulnerability · Published Aug 6, 2026 · Assigned by VulnCheck
CVE-2026-5857Contiki-NG MQTT Client Out-of-Bounds Write in PUBLISH Topic Parser via Persistent State Between TCP Segments
High 8.1
In plain English
A high-severity out-of-bounds write in Contiki-NG from Contiki-NG. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.9% (higher than 60% of all known vulnerabilities).
Official description
Contiki-NG's MQTT client parse_publish_vhdr() in os/net/app-layer/mqtt/mqtt.c sets topic_len_received=1 before checking topic_len against the 64-byte limit, so an over-length topic returns early but leaves the flag set. On the next TCP segment, tcp_input() re-invokes the parser with topic_received==0, and the persisted topic_len_received==1 skips the length-reading block containing the guard, falling through directly to a memcpy() that uses the unvalidated 16-bit topic_len as the copy length. The 65-byte topic[] destination overruns into adjacent struct fields including the payload_chunk pointer, which subsequent MQTT code dereferences, giving a compromised or attacker-controlled broker an arbitrary-pointer-write primitive. Contiki-NG's MQTT implementation has no TLS support so the connection is plaintext. Impact ranges from information disclosure and denial of service to remote code execution on embedded targets without memory protection.
Affected products (as reported)
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| Contiki-NG | Contiki-NG | 0 – before a34a2dbdc8bea784bd2ae5079aa4be520cd74f2d |
Weakness: CWE-787 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
- https://github.com/contiki-ng/contiki-ng product
- https://github.com/contiki-ng/contiki-ng/pull/3163 issue-tracking
- https://github.com/contiki-ng/contiki-ng/commit/a34a2dbdc8bea784bd2ae5079aa4be520cd74f2d patch
- Blog Post technical-description