Vulnerability · Published Jul 20, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M
CVE-2026-47134ClearanceKit: Policy signing key in System Keychain has permissive ACL allowing any local-root process to forge signed policy
Medium 6.9
In plain English
A medium-severity incorrect permission assignment in clearancekit from craigjbass. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.2% (higher than 4% of all known vulnerabilities).
Official description
ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. The ECDSA private key used to sign the on-disk policy database (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is stored in the macOS System Keychain. The key was created via the two-step pattern `SecKeyCreateRandomKey` (in-memory) followed by `SecItemAdd(kSecValueRef:, kSecAttrAccess:)` (persist). Prior to version 5.0.10, for `kSecClassKey` items in the legacy System Keychain, `kSecAttrAccess` passed to `SecItemAdd` is silently ignored — the persisted key inherits no ACL restriction. The same access builder applied to `kSecClassGenericPassword` items correctly binds the ACL, making this bug specific to the EC key. The result is that any process running as root can use the key to produce valid signatures over arbitrary policy content. Version 5.0.10 fixes the issue. No known workarounds are available. Disabling the system extension and manually removing the System Keychain item labelled `clearancekit policy signing key` would prevent the forged-signature path but also disables policy enforcement.
Affected products (as reported)
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| craigjbass | clearancekit | < 5.0.10 |
Weakness: CWE-732 · Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N