Vulnerability · Published Oct 14, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M

CVE-2026-100413SeaweedFS: Hard-coded SSH host key can be presented by certain standalone SFTP Helm deployments

High 7.0

In plain English

A high-severity security flaw in seaweedfs from seaweedfs. Proof-of-concept exploit code is public. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.4% (higher than 31% of all known vulnerabilities).

Severity (CVSS 4.0)7.0High
Exploit odds (30 days)0.4%top 69.2% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: poc
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. From 4.0.388 until 4.41, the SFTP Helm chart embedded one unencrypted Ed25519 private host key in k8s/charts/seaweedfs/templates/sftp/sftp-secret.yaml as stringData.seaweedfs_sftp_ssh_private_key. A standalone deployment presented that public key when sftp.enabled and sftp.enableAuth were true, sftp.existingConfigSecret was not supplied, the legacy sftp.sshPrivateKey path remained selected, a valid config-ssh Secret allowed startup, and hostKeysFolder did not provide a later Ed25519 signer. An attacker able to redirect or intercept client traffic could impersonate that SFTP endpoint to clients that trusted the published host identity, exposing password credentials or data sent to the rogue endpoint. Default all-in-one and non-authenticated standalone paths did not load the key. This issue is fixed in version 4.41.

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
seaweedfs seaweedfs >= 4.0.388, < 4.41

Weakness: CWE-321 · Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

References