Vulnerability · Published Sep 29, 2026 · Assigned by apache

CVE-2026-91085Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin

Medium 6.3

In plain English

A medium-severity missing authorization in Apache Karaf from Apache Software Foundation. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.4% (higher than 32% of all known vulnerabilities).

Severity (CVSS 3.1)6.3Medium
Exploit odds (30 days)0.4%top 68.5% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: none
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
Apache Software Foundation Apache Karaf 0 – before 4.4.12

Weakness: CWE-862 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

References