Vulnerability · Published Oct 21, 2026 · Assigned by zephyr

CVE-2026-79976NULL pointer dereference in the MCTP I2C+GPIO target binding triggerable by a peer I2C controller

High 7.1

In plain English

A high-severity null pointer dereference in zephyr from zephyrproject. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.3% (higher than 22% of all known vulnerabilities).

Severity (CVSS 3.1)7.1High
Exploit odds (30 days)0.3%top 78.4% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: none
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b->reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b->rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop(). A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped. The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed. The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected.

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
zephyrproject zephyr 4.3.0 – before 4.3.24.4.0 – before 4.5.0

Weakness: CWE-476 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H

References