Vulnerability · Published Oct 3, 2026 · Assigned by bcorg

CVE-2026-71886OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority

High 8.2

In plain English

A high-severity incorrect authorization in BC-JAVA from Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.2% (higher than 6% of all known vulnerabilities). Fixed versions are available - upgrade the affected package.

Severity (CVSS 4.0)8.2High
Exploit odds (30 days)0.2%top 94.0% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: none
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.

Affected packages & fixed versions

EcosystemPackageFixed inAdvisory
Debian:12bouncycastleno fix listedDEBIAN-CVE-2026-71886
Debian:13bouncycastleno fix listedDEBIAN-CVE-2026-71886
Debian:14bouncycastle1.86-1DEBIAN-CVE-2026-71886
Ubuntu:26.04:LTSbouncycastleno fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-71886
Ubuntu:26.10bouncycastleno fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-71886

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA 1.81 – before 1.86

Weakness: CWE-863, CWE-285 · Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber

References