Vulnerability · Published Oct 30, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M
CVE-2026-63377TAKO AI Agent for Okta: Unauthenticated first-run administrator takeover
Critical 9.8
In plain English
A critical-severity missing authentication in okta-ai-agent from fctr-id. Proof-of-concept exploit code is public. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.4% (higher than 34% of all known vulnerabilities).
Official description
TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, `POST /api/auth/setup` in `src/api/routers/auth.py` allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The `initial_setup` function checks only the `is_setup` completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default `docker-compose.yml` publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the `Dockerfile` starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and `src/api/main.py` mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes `create_auth_user` with `UserRole.ADMIN` and `set_auth_cookie`, issuing a valid `fctr_session` JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.
Affected products (as reported)
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| fctr-id | okta-ai-agent | < 3.0.1-beta |
Weakness: CWE-306 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H