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Vulnerability · Published Oct 30, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M

CVE-2026-62334OpenVM's OpenVmHalo2Verifier self-call can bypass proof verification

High 8.7

In plain English

A high-severity security flaw in openvm from openvm-org. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.5% (higher than 45% of all known vulnerabilities).

Severity (CVSS 4.0)8.7High
Exploit odds (30 days)0.5%top 55.3% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: none
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Before 1.7.0 in the 1.x line and in affected 2.0 and 2.1 prereleases, `OpenVmHalo2Verifier.verify` constructs raw proof calldata from user-controlled `proofData`, performs a `staticcall` to `address(this)`, and treats a successful call as proof acceptance. If the first four proof bytes match another external selector exposed by the wrapper, dispatch can invoke a successful non-verifier function instead of the generated Halo2 fallback verifier. Applications using the generated Solidity wrapper can consequently accept arbitrary app commitments and public values without checking the proof suffix, accumulator, app commitments or public values. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.0, 2.0.0-rc.3 and 2.1.0-preview.

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
openvm-org openvm < 1.7.0>= 2.0.0-alpha, < 2.0.0-rc.3>= 2.1.0-dev.0, < 2.1.0-preview

Weakness: CWE-754 · Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References