Vulnerability · Published Jul 7, 2026 · Assigned by EEF

CVE-2026-56812Phoenix JavaScript presence client crashes on presence keys colliding with Object.prototype members in Presence.syncState/syncDiff

Medium 6.3

In plain English

A medium-severity security flaw in phoenix from phoenixframework. Proof-of-concept exploit code is public. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.8% (higher than 57% of all known vulnerabilities). Fixed versions are available - upgrade the affected package.

Severity (CVSS 4.0)6.3Medium
Exploit odds (30 days)0.8%top 43.4% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: poc
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError. The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution). This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9; phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9.

Affected packages & fixed versions

EcosystemPackageFixed inAdvisory
npmphoenix1.5.15, 1.6.17, 1.7.24, 1.8.9EEF-CVE-2026-56812
npmphoenix1.5.15GHSA-63mc-hw7g-86rr
npmphoenix1.6.17GHSA-63mc-hw7g-86rr
npmphoenix1.7.24GHSA-63mc-hw7g-86rr
npmphoenix1.8.9GHSA-63mc-hw7g-86rr

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
phoenixframework phoenix 1.2.0-rc.0 – before 1.5.151.6.0-rc.0 – before 1.6.171.7.0-rc.0 – before 1.7.241.8.0-rc.0 – before 1.8.9
phoenixframework phoenix 1.2.0-rc.0 – before 1.5.151.6.0-rc.0 – before 1.6.171.7.0-rc.0 – before 1.7.241.8.0-rc.0 – before 1.8.9
phoenixframework phoenix 2270aaf21bd02c6a6a1022820564efb605a97655 – before *

Weakness: CWE-754 · Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References