CVE-2026-55369Waline login accepts a non-string email as a match-all MongoDB query

Official description

Waline is a comment system with backend support. Prior to version 1.41.1, the login endpoint POST /api/token reads the email field from the request body without checking its type and passes it straight into the MongoDB storage query. When email is not a string (for example a JSON object such as {"$ne": null}), the MongoDB storage adapter's parseWhere silently DROPS the field rather than rejecting the request, producing an empty filter that matches ALL users. The endpoint then verifies the submitted password against the FIRST user returned (user[0]), which in Waline is the first-registered user — the site administrator. This is a PARTIAL authentication bypass, not a full one. The attacker still needs a valid password for that first user; this is not a zero-knowledge bypass and it does not disclose passwords. Its concrete effects are: (1) the email/identifier factor is removed for the administrator account, (2) user enumeration (a non-string email never fails the "no such user" branch), and (3) credential-stuffing amplification — an attacker can test a leaked or weak password against the administrator account without knowing the administrator's email. This issue has been patched in version 1.41.1.

Affected packages & fixed versions

Affected products (as reported)

References

• https://github.com/walinejs/waline/security/advisories/GHSA-jf75-q64q-g65r x_refsource_CONFIRM
• https://github.com/walinejs/waline/pull/3646 x_refsource_MISC
• https://github.com/walinejs/waline/commit/e611aed4e571c2a86103f5cee48791ca6b460360 x_refsource_MISC