Vulnerability · Published Jun 10, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M
CVE-2026-45558Roxy-WI: Authenticated RCE on every managed HAProxy load balancer via `option` field config injection in section save
Critical 9.9
In plain English
A critical-severity improper input validation in roxy-wi from roxy-wi. Proof-of-concept exploit code is public. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.4% (higher than 38% of all known vulnerabilities).
Official description
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy/<server_id>/section/<section_type> and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Affected products (as reported)
Weakness: CWE-20, CWE-77, CWE-78, CWE-94 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
- https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advisories/GHSA-w2x4-66jj-3597 x_refsource_CONFIRM