Vulnerability · Published Apr 21, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M

CVE-2026-40497FreeScout Vulnerable to CSS Injection via Stored Style Tag in Mailbox Signature (CSRF Token Exfiltration)

High 8.1

In plain English

A high-severity cross-site scripting in freescout from freescout-help-desk. Proof-of-concept exploit code is public. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.2% (higher than 16% of all known vulnerabilities).

Severity (CVSS 3.1)8.1High
Exploit odds (30 days)0.2%top 84.4% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: poc
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

FreeScout is a free self-hosted help desk and shared mailbox. Prior to version 1.8.213, FreeScout's `Helper::stripDangerousTags()` removes `<script>`, `<form>`, `<iframe>`, `<object>` but does NOT strip `<style>` tags. The mailbox signature field is saved via POST /mailbox/settings/{id} and later rendered unescaped via `{!! $conversation->getSignatureProcessed([], true) !!}` in conversation views. CSP allows `style-src * 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`, so injected inline styles execute freely. An attacker with access to mailbox settings (admin or agent with mailbox permission) can inject CSS attribute selectors to exfiltrate the CSRF token of any agent/admin who views a conversation in that mailbox. With the CSRF token, the attacker can perform any state-changing action as the victim (create admin accounts, change email/password, etc.) — privilege escalation from agent to admin. This is the result of an incomplete fix of GHSA-jqjf-f566-485j. That advisory reported XSS via mailbox signature. The fix applied `Helper::stripDangerousTags()` to the signature before saving. However, `stripDangerousTags()` only removes `script`, `form`, `iframe`, and `object` tags — it does NOT strip `<style>` tags, leaving CSS injection possible. Version 1.8.213 contains an updated fix.

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
freescout-help-desk freescout < 1.8.213

Weakness: CWE-79 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

References