Vulnerability · Published Mar 26, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M

CVE-2026-33495Ory Oathkeeper has an authentication bypass by usage of untrusted header

Medium 6.5

In plain English

A medium-severity missing authorization in oathkeeper from ory. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.2% (higher than 16% of all known vulnerabilities). Fixed versions are available - upgrade the affected package.

Severity (CVSS 3.1)6.5Medium
Exploit odds (30 days)0.2%top 84.5% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: none
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

ORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. Ory Oathkeeper is often deployed behind other components like CDNs, WAFs, or reverse proxies. Depending on the setup, another component might forward the request to the Oathkeeper proxy with a different protocol (http vs. https) than the original request. In order to properly match the request against the configured rules, Oathkeeper considers the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header when evaluating rules. The configuration option `serve.proxy.trust_forwarded_headers` (defaults to false) governs whether this and other `X-Forwarded-*` headers should be trusted. Prior to version 26.2.0, Oathkeeper did not properly respect this configuration, and would always consider the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header. In order for an attacker to abuse this, an installation of Ory Oathkeeper needs to have distinct rules for HTTP and HTTPS requests. Also, the attacker needs to be able to trigger one but not the other rule. In this scenario, the attacker can send the same request but with the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header in order to trigger the other rule. We do not expect many configurations to meet these preconditions. Version 26.2.0 contains a patch. Ory Oathkeeper will correctly respect the `serve.proxy.trust_forwarded_headers` configuration going forward, thereby eliminating the attack scenario. We recommend upgrading to a fixed version even if the preconditions are not met. As an additional mitigation, it is generally recommended to drop any unexpected headers as early as possible when a request is handled, e.g. in the WAF.

Affected packages & fixed versions

EcosystemPackageFixed inAdvisory
Gogithub.com/ory/oathkeeper0.40.10-0.20260320084810-e9acca14a04dGO-2026-4810
Gogithub.com/ory/oathkeeper0.40.10-0.20260320084810-e9acca14a04dGHSA-vhr5-ggp3-qq85

Affected products (as reported)

VendorProductVersions
ory oathkeeper < 26.2.0

Weakness: CWE-862 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References