Vulnerability · Published Mar 19, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M
CVE-2026-32747SiYuan: Incomplete sensitive path blocklist in globalCopyFiles allows reading /proc and Docker secrets
Medium 6.8
In plain English
A medium-severity path traversal in siyuan from siyuan-note. Proof-of-concept exploit code is public. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.4% (higher than 38% of all known vulnerabilities).
Official description
SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.
Affected packages & fixed versions
| Ecosystem | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | no fix listed | GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6 |
| Go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | no fix listed | GO-2026-4705 |
Affected products (as reported)
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| siyuan-note | siyuan | < 3.6.1 |
Weakness: CWE-22, CWE-184 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N