Vulnerability · Published Aug 15, 2026 · Assigned by Wordfence

CVE-2026-18438Templately <= 3.7.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution via Gutenberg Cloud Import Attachment Filename Mismatch

High 8.8

In plain English

A high-severity unrestricted file upload in Templately – Elementor & Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free & Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! from wpdevteam. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 1.3% (higher than 71% of all known vulnerabilities).

Severity (CVSS 3.1)8.8High
Exploit odds (30 days)1.3%top 29.2% of all CVEs
Exploited in the wildNo reportsCISA SSVC: none
Attack toolingNoneno public tooling known

Official description

The Templately – Elementor & Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free & Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.

Affected products (as reported)

Weakness: CWE-434 · Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References