Vulnerability · Published Oct 26, 2026 · Assigned by EEF
CVE-2026-112880CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney
Low 2.1
In plain English
A low-severity security flaw in hackney from benoitc. There are no confirmed reports of exploitation so far. The chance it is exploited in the next 30 days is estimated at 0.2% (higher than 8% of all known vulnerabilities).
Official description
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
Affected products (as reported)
Weakness: CWE-113 · Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
References
- hackney 4.9.0 release notes vendor-advisory, related
- EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-112880 related
- OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-112880 related
- Refuse CR/LF/NUL in the proxy_auth_fun result (benoitc/hackney#989) related
- Introducing commit 5df5a74 in benoitc/hackney related
- Fix commit 5ee7d7d in benoitc/hackney patch